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Chapter 4
Risk Management and Conflicts of Interest
Leslie Francis
Abstract
Risk management aims to reduce the costs of adverse events. In entities such as
hospitals, risk managers do this in two ways: reducing the likelihood or seriousness of
adverse events and reducing the costs of these events when they do happen. Activities
aimed at the latter present direct conflicts of interest between protecting the institution
and respecting the interests of the clients served by the institution—so-called institutional
conflicts of interest. Activities aimed at the former would appear to benefit all parties-those at risk of accidents (because the risk is reduced) and the institution (because
reducing risks also reduces the costs of adverse events)--and thus escape problems of
conflicts. This appearance may also misleading, however, if efforts to reduce risks to
agents of the institution (such as hospital staff) conflict indirectly with efforts to reduce
risks to clients (such as patients). Here, too, institutional conflicts of interest may arise for
the risk manager.
This chapter discusses the role of the risk manager in handling institutional
conflicts of interest in health care organizations. When risk managers attempt to reduce
the costs of adverse events to the institution, conflicts of interest are likely to arise and to
present ethical issues for the risk manager. These conflicts are institutional ones that are
built into the risk manager’s role: the risk manager’s goal is to settle potentially
expensive claims on terms that are favorable to the institution rather than on the terms
that might be most beneficial to the patient. These conflicts must be identified and
managed ethically.
Introduction
In the play, “An Enemy of the People,” Ibsen’s character Dr. Thomas Stockmann informs
local officials that their town’s well-known and highly lucrative baths are contaminated
by runoff from a local tannery. Stockmann is the chief medical officer for the baths,
much sought after for their healing capabilities. After observing unusual episodes of
illness in some of the baths’ visitors, Stockmann sends water samples off for analysis to a
major university. When the results indicate contamination, he urges closure of the baths
to protect the health of visitors—a judgment based on his assessment of the risks and
benefits of leaving the baths open.
Ibsen’s play is a classic drama of honesty and self-righteousness against
community spirit and greed—with all the subtle strengths and weaknesses of each of
these. But it is also a prescient drama about the role of a public health risk manager and
the individual and social conflicts attending that role. As an individual, Stockmann
prides himself on being a scientist and taking care to withhold his concerns from the
community until he has confirmed test results. Yet there is also a ring of “I told you so”
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in how he conveys the news to the town officials; Stockmann had argued for a more
expensive piping system that would have avoided the risk of pollution contamination of
the baths. Although Stockmann expects to be a town hero for what he has learned, it
comes as no surprise to the audience that he is disbelieved, dismissed from his position,
evicted from his home, and declared an “enemy of the people.”
In the play, Ibsen draws a masterful portrait of conflicts of interest: Stockmann
has interests in his scientific reputation, his family, his position as medical director, and
his medical practice. The town has financial interests in the success of the baths and in
its reputation. The town leaders have interests in their positions with the town as well as
their own economic interests. But there is more. At the end of the play, Stockmann is
confronted with perhaps the most traditional form of conflict of interest: he learns that
the owner of the tannery, his wife’s adoptive father, was planning to leave a sizeable
inheritance to Stockmann’s wife and children. To pressure Stockmann to clear the
tannery of responsibility for the pollution, his adoptive father-in-law has invested his
fortune in the baths and tells Stockmann that unless the baths are cleared, he will leave
the fortune to a charity. Deprived of income with which to support his family,
Stockmann faces a “horribly painful dilemma,” deepened by the recognition that some
believe that he has criticized the baths so that his adoptive father in law could profiteer
from investing in the baths on highly favorable terms. Yet Stockmann remains pure: he
refuses the inheritance and plans to provide medical care for the poor in the town.
Ibsen’s play was written over one hundred years ago, but healthcare risk managers face
many of these same conflicts of interest today.
This chapter begins with a discussion of conflicts of interest, both individual and
institutional. It then considers the role of the healthcare risk manager and explains how
that role may incorporate institutional conflicts of interest. The chapter then applies this
analysis to the role of the risk manager in disclosure or apology programs designed to
reduce malpractice costs. It concludes with three suggestions for alleviating these
conflicts of interest: limitations on confidentiality requirements in settlement agreements,
a requirement that patients receive independent advice before entering these agreements,
and development of the capability for independent review of settlements.
Understanding Conflicts of Interest
Understood most broadly, conflicts of interest in the professional context occur when
judgments about the exercise of professional obligations are, or might be, affected unduly
by interests extrinsic to professional relationships. One influential characterization of this
situation is that “secondary” interests adversely affect “primary” professional interests.
(Thompson 1993) Identifying such conflicts thus requires a determination of
professional obligations as primary interests, an understanding of what interests are
extrinsic to the professional relationship and thus secondary, and judgments about when
such secondary interests affect or might affect professionals in ways they should not.
Some professions such as law have developed highly formalized statements of
professional obligations and how various conflicts of interest may affect them;
disciplinary mechanisms may be invoked when actions violate these obligations. Other
professions have far less elaborate professional codes. Unlike law or medicine, many
professions—including healthcare risk management in most states—do not require

2

licensure—a common method for the enforcement of professional obligations. In many
fields, moreover, contractual obligations to employers such as confidentiality, noncompete clauses, or agreements to limit services, may lie in uneasy tension with primary
profession obligations or other secondary interests.
As will be discussed more fully below, there may also be no clear delineation of
which interests are considered secondary to the professional relationship. Personal
financial interests and interests of family members are standardly identified as such
interests. (Lo & Fried 2009, p. 32) General ideological orientations or political
affiliations are frequently not judged to be conflictual interests, even though they may
affect decision-making, unless they can be linked directly to some form of personal
advantage. Interests in reputation, public recognition, or career advancement may be as
influential on decision-making but far more difficult to identify than financial interests.
(Thompson 1993) They thus may be considered secondary interests although they are
often not addressed directly in professional codes of conduct or conflicts of interest
policies.
Secondary interests are not problematic per se. They may become problematic
when they divert judgment in the context of professional relationships. Thompson (1993)
writes:
The secondary interest is usually not illegitimate in itself, and indeed it
may even be a necessary and desirable part of professional practice. Only
its relative weight in professional decisions is problematic. The aim is not
to eliminate or necessarily to reduce financial gain or other secondary
interests (such as preference for family and friends or the desire for
prestige and power). It is rather to prevent these secondary factors from
dominating or appearing to dominate the relevant primary interest in the
making of professional decisions.
In healthcare, observational research has addressed correlations between
individual economic interests of physicians and treatment recommendations. (Lo & Fried
2009, Ch. 6) Such research also reveals correlations between relationships with
pharmaceutical companies and other commercial enterprises and published research
findings. (Lo & Fried 2009, Ch. 4) When the interests of patients or human subjects are
compromised, the influence of conflicts of interest is clearly problematic. A well-known
illustration is the death of Jesse Gelsinger, a participant who died in a trial of gene
therapy at the University of Pennsylvania. The study’s lead researcher had substantial
financial interests in the company that would profit if the trials were successful—interests
that were valued at least $13.5 million and perhaps much more. (Wilson 2010) The
University also had equity interests in the company and financial interests in continuing
to receive research support from the company. Indeed, the researcher was permitted to
have such large financial interests in an agreement that supposedly shielded him from
making scientific decisions and provided the University with the relationship with the
company. Neither Jesse Gelsinger nor his family were informed of the extent of the
financial ties or of potential risks of the study that had become apparent in earlier trials
using animals as well as with earlier patients in the study. (Wilson 2010) The firestorm of
criticism that followed Gelsinger’s death in the trial focused primarily on these financial
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ties—but reputational, career, and institutional interests may also have played important
roles in the tragedy, so much so that Wilson (2010) argues that prohibition of the
financial ties might not have been all that was necessary.
Discussions of conflicts of interest in healthcare increasingly recognize that
institutional conflicts may exist in addition to individual conflicts (Rose 2013, Friedman
& McKinney 2013, Lo & Field 2009; Emanuel & Steiner 1995) According to the
Institute of Medicine, “Institutional conflicts of interest arise when an institution’s own
interests or those of its senior officials pose risks of undue influence on decisions
involving the institution’s primary interests” in the sense of obligations to those the
institution serves (Lo & Field, 218) Federal regulations regarding government ethics also
recognize the reality of institutional conflicts of interest; government employees, even
special government employees such as those serving on advisory committees or
temporary employees on leave from other positions, must not participate in the
development of policies that might have a distinct impact on their institutions other than
as members of a general class of institutions. (18 C.F.R. § 2640.203 (2014)) The
examples in these regulations cite financial concerns, such as the development of a grants
and contracts policy. Federal regulations governing conflicts of interest in federally
funded research likewise focus on the financial interests of researchers or persons in
institutional positions of authority. (42 C.F.R. Part 50, 45 C.F.R. Part 94 (2014);
Friedman & McKinney 2013).
Particularly as federal funding for biomedical research has become more limited,
academic medical institutions have pursued ties with industry. Concerns about
maintaining the loyalty of commercial donors may impact decisions about faculty
members and threaten the freedom to publish information critical of donors. (Shafer
2003) Competition to retain well-funded faculty members and to pursue grant
opportunities has intensified as well. These are institutional—not individual—conflicts
of interest and may require policies to address them (Friedman & McKinney 2013) or
perhaps even restrict them. (Shafer 2003) Arguably, they may be as serious as individual
conflicts of interest in diverting judgments away from the institution’s obligations to the
individuals they serve. (Lo & Fried 2009, p. 216) However, regulations and institutional
policies currently in place typically address institutional conflicts only as they are
reflected in individual conflicts. There are some exceptions; for example, Stanford
University’s institutional conflict of interest policy states explicitly that if investigators at
the University are engaged in research that may affect the University’s intellectual
property rights or equity holdings, these properties will be sequestered in an account held
by an independent third party. (Stanford University 2014)
Conflict of interest rules seek to preserve the integrity of professional judgment
and to maintain confidence in them. (Thompson 1993) Both individual and institutional
conflicts of interest may result in a lack of trustworthiness and concomitantly
inappropriately placed trust when those served by the institution do not realize that the
institution’s interests are being placed first. (Rose 2013)
The Roles of Healthcare Risk Managers
Risk management in health care addresses the frequency, severity, and costs of adverse
events. It is still a relatively new and still evolving professional field. Emerging in the
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1970s in response to perceptions of a “malpractice crisis” of increased costs, the field
originally sought to confront loss reduction directly by prevention and mitigation. (Core
Risk Services 2014) The American Society for Healthcare Risk Management (ASHRM)
was founded in 1980 as the American Society for Hospital Risk Managers and reflects
these dual goals of increased safety and reduced institutional costs of errors or accidents.
One major way in which healthcare risk management is evolving as a field is its
relation to and interconnection with quality improvement. For the most part, the fields
have developed along separate paths and employ different goals and methods. If the goal
of risk management is reduction of losses due to malpractice claims, and the goal of
quality improvement is patient safety and care quality, the two are distinct enterprises
each with unique ethical concerns. For example, the argument that it is appropriate to use
patient data without consent for quality improvement activities as that might benefit their
ongoing care or the care of patients like them cannot be applied as easily to the use of
patient information to reduce liability costs. (Jennings et al. 2007, Baily et al. 2006) Data
analyses devoted to patient safety may prioritize identifying events that may affect many
people but that are unlikely to result in high-cost litigation, whereas analyses devoted to
loss prevention may prioritize efforts to prevent events that give rise to such litigation.
On the other hand, to the extent that improved patient safety and care quality reduce
malpractice costs—as they surely do at least to some extent—the goals of the two fields
align. Indeed, in many small healthcare facilities the same staff may perform both
functions.
As concerns about patient safety and care quality have drawn increased attention,
the need for connections between risk management and quality improvement activities
has increasingly been emphasized. The publication of research about the frequency of
medical errors (e.g. Leape 1994) highlighted problems of patient safety (IOM 1999) as
well as the possibility that improved patient safety would reduce the costs of malpractice.
The subsequent growth of the patient safety movement has led to recognition that risk
management and care quality functions must work together. (ASHRM 2007) A primary
example of the disclosure, apology, and offer programs described below, that of the
University of Michigan, incorporates risk manager analysis of whether care was
reasonable and how unreasonable forms of care can be avoided. The program assigns
risk managers to particular clinical areas in order to carry out these patient safety
activities. (Boothman et al. 2009) Such efforts of healthcare risk managers directed to
reducing the frequency or severity of adverse events or to improving care quality would
appear to be aligned with the interests of patients. To the extent that this alignment
exists, interests of the healthcare facility and its patients are not in conflict.
In many other ways, however, interests of healthcare facilities and risk managers
who work in them may be in conflict with the interests of patients. These conflicts and
the ethical issues they create are the focus of the remainder of this chapter. The next
section outlines the ethical principles that have been developed for public and private risk
managers and considers how they might function in the context of conflicts of interest
between institutions and the patients they serve. The chapter continues with an in depth
discussion of an institutional conflict of interest that is arguably endemic in the role of the
risk manager: development of disclosure, apology, and offer programs designed to
encourage early settlements in situations in which patients were harmed by medical
errors. A concluding section explores three possibilities for addressing this conflict:
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limitations on confidentiality requirements in settlement agreements, a requirement that
patients receive independent advice before entering these agreements, and development
of the capability for independent review of settlements.
Ethics for Healthcare Risk Managers
The ASHRM Code of Professional Conduct (2012) divides risk manager responsibilities
into two groups: responsibilities to the profession and responsibilities to those they serve.
In the framework for conflict of interest analysis given above, these responsibilities
would be the primary interests of the risk manager.
Among responsibilities to the profession, the ASHRM Code lists identifying,
acknowledging, and disclosing potential conflicts of interest. Responsibilities to those
served include respect by practicing in a non-discriminatory manner, recognizing that
patients and their families are entitled to fair treatment, communicating honestly and
factually, and sharing confidential information only where appropriate and permitted by
law. This set of responsibilities also emphasizes patient safety; responsibilities of the risk
manager include investigating and analyzing events to reduce the likelihood of similar
injury to others, promoting cultural change that encourages reporting events that might
result in injury, and advocating for patient safety.
In a third section, the ASHRM Code discusses individual conflicts of interest in
further detail. This section singles out transactions with former employers or business
associates, business transactions inuring to personal benefit or benefit of family members,
and investments or activities which conflict or appear to conflict with the interests of
employer or client as conflicts of interest for risk managers. The Code judges that
business transactions inuring to personal benefit are unacceptable even with disclosure;
other potential conflicts require full disclosure but may be permissible.
The ASHRM Code’s treatment of conflicts of interest thus focuses on individual
economic benefit or other individual benefits, not the possibility that the role of the risk
manager may itself involve a conflict of interest between the interests of the healthcare
institution and the interests of the patients it serves. For the risk manager, the primary
professional interests of providing patients and their families with fair treatment and
communicating factually and honestly could be deflected by the secondary interests of
the institution in reducing costs and the secondary interests of the risk manager him or
herself in professional reputation, job security, and advancement. In this individual
focus, the ASHRM Code is not alone; official ethics statements for public risk managers
take a similar stance. The Public Risk Management Association, the association of risk
managers in the public sector, has a Code of Ethics (2014) that gives these illustrations of
prohibited conflicts of interest: misuse of public resources, improper outside
employment, acceptance of gifts or nepotism, and engagement in activities that will
create a hostile work environment. Yet contemporary discussions of institutional
conflicts of interest note that the analysis applied to conflicts in research and patient
treatment may also be relevant to other aspects of the healthcare enterprise.
(Lo & Field 2009, p. 32)
Disclosure Programs and Institutional Conflicts of Interest
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A recent, highly praised strategy for healthcare institutions to reduce costs of malpractice
litigation is to encourage early settlement through disclosure, apology, and offer to
patients. This strategy is proposed as a replacement for a “deny and defend” strategy
seeking to win malpractice lawsuits. It has resulted in multiplicity of state laws shielding
disclosures or apologies from litigation in a wide variety of ways. (Boothman et al. 2009)
Important differences among such programs include whether they are disclosure only,
whether they include apologies, and what kinds of disclosures are made. For example,
some programs merely acknowledge to the patient that an adverse event occurred that
was related to their care, without in any way apologizing or admitting responsibility for
the event. Others will say they were sorry for what occurred but take care not to link such
expressions of sympathy with admissions of fault that might give rise to liability claims.
The contemporary apology movement began with a report of “humanistic” risk
management policies at a Veterans Affairs medical center that reported reduced liability
payments. (Kramen & Hamm 1999) Although the study reported only a small case series
and policy makers recognized that Veterans Affairs institutions might not be
representative of healthcare institutions more generally, the reported findings generated
great interest. In 2010, the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) funded
a series of demonstration projects testing the concept that early disclosure or errors might
reduce litigation costs (Mello, Studdert & Kachalia 2014). One larger hospital system
with a disclosure program that also received grants under the AHRQ program—the
University of Michigan—has reported reduced claims frequency, transaction costs,
incidence of litigation, and time to dispute resolution. (Boothman et al. 2009) In
addition, the Michigan experience reports a cultural shift to patient safety after inception
of the disclosure program. (Boothman, Imhoff, & Campbell 2012)
Some published studies indicate reductions in litigation and settlement amounts
after institution of a program of disclosure (Adams 2014). Other studies suggest that the
changes are more likely to occur with cultural changes within institutions rather than
being associated with state law innovations. (Perez & DiDona 2010) These studies
report data that might suggest changes that are in both the interests of patients and the
interests of institutions, if institutions shift to a culture of patient safety that results in
reduced frequency of costly errors. On the other hand, reports of reduced costs may
reflect reduced litigation costs and lower settlement offers to patients rather than concerns
reflecting the interests of patients. The impact of institutional conflicts of interests thus
remains unclear from these studies.
To consider the extent to which institutional conflicts of interest may have been
recognized or acknowledged in studies of apology or disclosure programs, or in reports of
the programs themselves, I conducted a pubmed search for “apology and malpractice and
date after 2000.”1 This search yielded a total of 42 articles. Many of these cited other
articles discussing apology and disclosure programs and I included these as well in my
database. After excluding all articles reporting activities outside of the United States and
articles about which no information was available (primarily trade publications or local
bar journals), I then reviewed 35 articles for the following factors: (1) did the article
express a view about whether disclosure or apology was ethically desirable? (2) did the
Other search strategies, such as “(apology or disclosure) and (malpractice or
liability)” yielded thousands of articles, most dealing with malpractice risks.
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article express a view about whether disclosure or apology was likely to create an
improved climate of patient safety or otherwise improve care? (3) did the article express a
view about whether apology or disclosure was likely to reduce the costs of litigation? (4)
did the article raise any questions about whether the patient’s interests were adequately
represented in the process of settlement after apology or disclosure? Full results of my
analysis are presented in the table in appendix A.
Some of the articles were discussions of the apology and disclosure movement
presented as information to particular medical specialties (e.g. Vercler, Buchman &
Chung 2014, plastic surgeons; Sohn & Bal 2012, orthopedists; Surbone 2012,
oncologists; Baker, Lauro & Sintim-Damoa 2008, radiologists). Some articles focused
on physician reluctance to disclosure and how this might be overcome (e.g. Surbone
2012; Pelt & Faldmo 2008; Saxton & Finkelstein 2008); Wei 2007). Many were articles
in law reviews describing or assessing the impact of the different types of state apology
and disclosure laws (e.g. Mello, Studdert & Kachalia 2014; Raper 2011; Hyman 2010;
Mastroianni 2010; Perez & DiDona 2009; Robbinelt 2009; McDonnell & Guenther
2008). Three reported on the success of their institutional apology and disclosure
programs (Boothman, Imhoff & Campbell 2012, University of Michigan; Quinn &
Eichler 2008, Colorado COPIC program; Kraman et al. 2002, Lexington VA).
Ten articles raised questions about fair compensation for patients, several in ways
that suggested sensitivity to the possibility of institutional conflicts of interest. Articles
portraying the University of Michigan program, for example, cited cost reductions as
only an incidental advantage of an effort to create an environment of fairness and
openness (Boothman, Imhoff & Campbell 2012; Chung et al. 2011). Hyman (2010),
cites data to the effect that patients report satisfaction with disclosure programs and do
not report feeling pressured unfairly into settlements. Several articles point out that
physicians may have fiduciary responsibilities to their patients that are not shared by risk
managers (Loren et al. 2010; Quinn & Eichner 2008). Mello, Studdert & Kachalia
(2014) note that compensation may be difficult to calculate fairly. Chung et al. (2011)
caution against the possibility that physicians and hospitals that are independent actors
(and not covered under a single self-insured malpractice umbrella) may behave
strategically in order to shift liability costs to others involved in care.
Two articles stood out in raising questions about the possible impact of disclosure
programs on fairness to patients. In a 2014 critical analysis of the impact of tort reform
on liability costs, Mello, Studdert & Kachalia argue that tort reforms do not account for a
significant percentage of the reduction in liability costs over the preceding decade.
Instead, they argue that initial reports from the AHRQ demonstration projects suggest
that programs communicating about injury with patients have had promising results.
These authors note, however, that the proactive compensation component of these
programs “may be more difficult for institutions to consistently execute” than
communication, because insurers calculate compensation offers based on the likelihood
of suit rather than on a principled analysis of whether substandard care caused harm. In
their study of disclosure, apology, and offer programs, Bell and coauthors (Bell et al.
2010) conducted key informant interviews and found increased transparency, improved
patient safety, reduced liability costs, and rapid and fair compensation as goals of these
programs. Informants also feared that these programs would be perceived as “anticonsumer” efforts to settle cases quickly, for limited amounts, and without the benefit of
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independent advice for patients. In the judgment of this study’s authors, “Making whole
those patients who have been harmed through medical negligence as quickly and fairly as
possible after a harmful error diminishes any conflicts of interest on the part of the
physician or the institution to help the patient while avoiding litigation and helps preserve
therapeutic relationships between patients and caregivers.” (Bell et al. 2010, 694-95)
Despite raising the issue of compensation fairness, none of these articles
conceptualized the possibility of institutional conflict of interest directly. Importantly,
none raised the possibility that risk managers might face this conflict in dealing with the
disclosure process, making recommendations about settlement offers, or discussing
compensation with patients.
Conclusion: Some Recommendations for Change
Despite their clear benefits, disclosure programs present possibilities of
institutional conflicts of interest. They may encourage patients to settle claims of injury
for settlement amounts that are unfair. Many discussions of these programs in the
literature do not recognize these fairness concerns. Others, while recognizing the
possibility of unfairness, do not conceptualize it in terms of a conflict of interest. In this
conclusion, I suggest three additions to the disclosure process that might help to mitigate
conflict of interest risks.
(1) Reminding the patient that they have an opportunity to seek outside counsel
and that doing so might be beneficial to them. When attorneys representing clients
consider entering into transactions with them, this is an attorney-client conflict of interest.
In such cases, ethical rules require attorneys to tell their clients that they have an
opportunity to seek outside counsel (ABA 2013). The institutional conflicts of interest
faced by the risk manager or others representing the health care provider are similar in
structure. Affording the opportunity for independent representation might thus be seen as
an appropriate conflict-mitigation measure.
(2) Reconsidering the confidentiality of settlement agreements. When settlements
are reached during the course of litigation, a condition of the settlement is typically that
the settlement amount will be kept secret. This makes it difficult for patients and their
representatives to know what others in similar circumstances may have received. It also
makes it difficult for researchers to scrutinize the fairness of settlement patterns.
(Knutsen 2010) Publication of settlement amounts in particular cases presents significant
risks to patient privacy. It also risks misleading others, as publication of settlement
amounts will not reveal the unique features of individual cases. On the other hand,
publication of aggregate numbers such as how many settlements have been reached by
the provider in a given year, in what categories of cases, and for what amounts, might
increase transparency in a manner that supports public interests in improved care and
fairness to patients.
(3) Establishing a mechanism for impartial review of disclosure, apology, and
offer programs. In her review of the Jesse Gelsinger case, Wilson (2010) argues that
banning institutional conflicts of interest would not have solved the problem of risks to
patients that these pose. Instead, she argues for an ongoing external review of these
conflicts, much as data safety monitoring boards assess the risks to patients of clinical
trials on an ongoing basis. Along these lines, the University of Michigan disclosure,
apology, and offer program features an internal review committee that assesses risk
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manager determinations of whether the error in care was an unreasonable one before a
settlement offer is made. This committee is designed to have a range of experts to counter
the tendency to “protect ones own.” (Boothman et al. 2009) As it is an internal
committee, however, it does not fully mitigate the risks of institutional conflicts.
Apology, disclosure and offer programs have growing appeal. Yet they present
clear institutional conflicts of interest for risk managers. These conflicts have been
under-appreciated in published assessments of these programs. Efforts to mitigate these
conflicts should be further explored by risk managers.
References
Adams, Megan A., B. Joseph Elmunzer & James M. Scheiman. 2014. “Effect of a Health
System’s Medical Error Disclosure Program on Gastroenterology-Related Claims
Rates and Costs.” American Journal of Gastroenterology 109: 460-464.
American Bar Association (ABA). 2013. Model Rules of Professional Conduct 1.8(a)(2).
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model
_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_8_current_clients_specific_rules.html.
American Society for Healthcare Risk Management (ASHRM). 2014. Celebrating 30
Years, A Brief History of ASHRM: 1980-2010.
http://www.ashrm.org/ashrm/about/history/a_brief_history_of_ashrm/.
-----. 2012. “Healthcare Risk Management Code of Professional Conduct.”
http://www.ashrm.org/about/governance/files/Code_of_Conduct_2013.pdf
-----. 2007. Different Roles, Same Goal: Risk and Quality Management Partnering for
Patient Safety.
http://www.ashrm.org/pubs/files/white_papers/Monograph.07RiskQuality.pdf.
Baker, Stephen, Christine Lauro & Akosua Sintim-Damoa. 2008. “Malpractice
Allegations and Apology Laws: Benefits and Risks for Radiologists.” Journal of
the American College of Radiology 5(12); 1186-1190.
Baily, Mary Ann, et al. 2006. The Ethics of Using QI Methods to Improve Quality and
Safety of Care. Garrison, N.Y.: The Hastings Center.
Bell, Sigall K. et al. 2012. “Disclosure, apology, and offer programs: stakeholders’ views
of barriers to and strategies for broad implementation.” Milbank Quarterly 90(4):
682-705.
Boothman, Richard C, Sarah J. Imhoff & Darrell A. Campbell, Jr. 2012. “Nurturing a
culture of patient safety and achieving lower malpractice risk through disclosure:
lessons learned and future directions.” Frontiers of Health Services Management
28(3): 13-28.
Chung, Eugene, et al. 2011. “Malpractice Suits and Physician Apologies in Cancer
Care.” Journal of Oncological Practice 7(6): 389-393.
Core Risk Services. 2014. “History of health care risk management programs.”
http://www.coreriskservicesinc.com/history.php.
Dresser, Rebecca. 2008. “The Limits of Apology Laws.” Hastings Center Report 38(3):
6-7.
Emanuel, Ezekiel J. & D. Steiner. 1995. “Institutional conflicts of interest.” New England
Journal of Medicine: 332: 262-268.
Foucar, E & M.R. Wick. 2007. “Tort reform: the pathologists’ perspective.” Seminars in
Diagnostic Pathology 24(2): 131-47.

10

Fredricks, Todd. R. 2012. “Efficacy of a Physician’s Words of Empathy: An Overview of
State Apology Laws.” Journal of the American Osteopathic Association 112(7):
405-406.
Friedman, Ralph S. & Ross McKinney, Jr. 2013. “Is Conflict of Interest Becoming a
Challenge for Institution-Based Institutional Review Boards?” Clinical Cancer
Research 19: 4034.
Hyman, Chris Stern, et al. 2010. “Interest-Based Mediation of Medical Malpractice
Lawsuits: A Route to Improved Patient Safety?” Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law 35(5): 797-828
Ibsen, Henrik. 1882. “An Enemy of the People.” Transl. R. Farquharson Sharp.
Available as a Project Gutenberg EBook,
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/2446/2446-h/2446-h.htm.
Institute of Medicine (IOM). 1999. To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System.
Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press.
Jennings, Bruce, et al., eds. 2007. Health Care Quality Improvement: Ethical and
Regulatory Issues. Garrison, N.Y.: The Hastings Center.
Kachalia, Allen & David W. Bates. 2014. “Disclosing medical errors: The view from the
USA.” The Surgeon 12: 64-67
Kachalia, Allen & Michelle M. Mello. 2011. “New directions in medical liability
reform.” New England Journal of Medicine 364(16): 1564-1572.
Knutsen, Erik. 2010. “Keeping Settlements Secret.” Florida State University Law Review
37(Summer): 945-979.
Kramen, S.S. et al. 2002. “John M Eisenberg Patient Safety Awards Advocacy: The
Lexington Veterans Affairs Medical Center.” Joint Commission Journal of Quality
Improvement 28(12): 646-670.
Kramen, SS & G Hamm. 1999. “Risk management: extreme honesty may be the best
policy.” Annals of Internal Medicine 131(12) 963-67.
Leape, Lucian L. 1994. “Error in Medicine.” Journal of the American Medical
Association 272:1851-1857.
Lo, Bernard & Marilyn J. Field, eds. 2009. Conflict of Interest in Medical Research,
Education, and Practice. Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine.
Loren, D.J. et al. 2010. “Risk managers, physicians, and disclosure of harmful medical
errors.” Joint Commission Journal of Quality & Patient Safety 36(3): 101-108.
Mastroianni, Anna C., et al. 2010. “The Flaws in State ‘Apology’ And ‘Disclosure’ Laws
Dilute Their Intended Impact On Malpractice Suits.” Health Affairs 29(9): 16111619.
McDonnell, William M. & Elisabeth Guenther. 2008. “Narrative Review: Do State Laws
Make it Easier to Say ‘I’m Sorry?’” Annals of Internal Medicine 149(11): 811815.
Mello, Michelle M., David M. Studdert & Allen Kachalia. 2014. “The Medical Liability
Climate and Prospects for Reform.” Journal of the American Medical Association
(Oct. 30), doi:10.1001/jama.2014.10705.
Murtagh, Lindsey et al. “Disclosure-and-resolution programs that include generous
compensation offers may prompt a complex patient response.” Health Affairs
31(12): 2681-2689.

11

Pelt, Jenny L. & Lynda P. Faldmo. 2008. “Physician Error and Disclosure.” Clinical
Obstetrics & Gynecology 51(4): 700–708.
Perez, Bianca, and Toni DiDona. 2009. “Assessing Legislative Potential to Institute
Error Transparency: A State Comparison of Malpractice Claims Rates.” Journal
for Healthcare Quality 32(3): 36-41.
Petronio, Sandra, et al. 2013 “Disclosing Medical Mistakes: A Communication
Management Plan for Physicians.” The Permanente Journal 17(2): 73-79.
Public Risk Management Association. 2014. Code of Ethics.
http://www.primacentral.org/resources/codeofethics.pdf.
Quinn, Richert E & Mary C. Eichler. 2008. “The 3Rs Program: The Colorado
Experience.”Clinical Obstetrics and Gynecology 51(4): 709-718.
Raper, Steven E. 2011. “No Role for Apology: Remedial Work and the Problem of
Medical Injury.” Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law & Ethics 11: 267-327.
Regis, C. & J. Poitras. 2010. “Healthcare mediation and the need for apologies.” Health
Law Journal 18:31-49.
Robbennelt, Jennifer. 2009. “Apologies and Medical Error.” Clinical Orthopedics and
Related Research 467(2): 376–382.
Rose, Susannah L. 2013. “Patient Advocacy Organizations: Institutional Conflicts of
Interest, Trust, and Trustworthiness.” Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics 41(3):
680-687.
Saitta, Nicole & Samuel D. Hodge, Jr. 2012. “Efficacy of a Physician’s Words of
Empathy: An Overview of State Apology Laws.” Journal of the American
Osteopathic Association 112(5): 302-306.
Saxton, J.W. & M.M. Finkelstein. 2008. “Adverse event management: your evidence to
decrease professional liability risk. Journal of Medical Practice Management
24(1): 5-8.
Shafer, Arthur. 2004. “Biomedical conflicts of interest: a defense of the sequestration
thesis—learning from the cases of Nancy Olivieri and David Healy.” Journal of
Medical Ethics 30: 8-24.
Sohn, David H. & B. Sonny Bal. 2012. “Medical Malpractice Reform: The Role of
Alternative Dispute Resolution.” Clinical Orthopaedics and Related Research
470(5):1370-1378
Stanford University. 2014. “Rule 4.7. Institutional Conflict of Interest in Research
Involving Human Subjects.” http://doresearch.stanford.edu/policies/researchpolicy-handbook/conflicts-commitment-and-interest/institutional-conflict-interestresearch-involving-human-subjects#anchor-670.
Surbone, A. 2012. “Oncologists’ difficulties in facing and disclosing medical errors:
suggestions for the clinic.” American Society of Clinical Oncology Education
Book 2012: e24-27, doi: 10.14694/EdBook_AM.2012.32.e24.
Taft, Lee. 2005. “Apology and medical mistake: opportunity or foil? Annals of Health
Law 14: 55-94.
Thompson, Dennis. 1993. “Understanding Financial Conflicts of Interest.” New England
Journal of Medicine 329: 573-576.
Vercler, C.J., S.R. Buchman, & K.C. Chung. 2014. “Discussing Harm-Causing Errors
With Patients: An Ethical Primer for Plastic Surgeons.” Annals of Plastic Surgery
(May 14, Epub ahead of print, PMID: 24830658).

12

Wei, M. 2007. “Doctors, apologies, and the law: an analysis and critique of apology
laws.” Journal of Health Law 40(1):107-159.
Wilson, Robin Fretwell. 2010. “The Death of Jesse Gelsinger: New Evidence of the
Influence of Money and Prestige in Human Research.” American Journal of Law &
Medicine 36(2-3): 295-325.
Zimmerman, R. 2004. “Doctors' new tool to fight lawsuits: saying ‘I'm sorry.’” Journal
of the Oklahoma State Medical Association 97(6): 245-47.
Appendix A
Table of Articles Surveyed
Study

Date
2014

Disclosure
Ethical?
Y*

Quality
Improvement?
Y

Reduced
Costs?
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Kachalia
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Bell et al.
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al.
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Y

Y

Y
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Y

Y
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Y
Y
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Y
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Y
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and effect
on liability
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Y

Y

Y
Y
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patients
quickly and
fairly;
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the
possibility
of strategic
behavior to
shift costs

No, but does
consider
whether
patients felt
pushed into
settlements
and whether
they reported
satisfaction
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